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January 15, 2004

Introduction

The year began with now-perennial worries over a "spring
offensive" from Albanian paramilitaries. While this did not in
fact occur, numerous low-intensity attacks and terrorist bombings
did go on throughout the year. As most of these were
Kosovo-related, it seemed that, yet again, the unresolved
situation there was the biggest threat to Macedonia's security.
Growing dissent in the UN-administered province led to an upsurge
in violence, against Serbs but also against UNMIK and KFOR
personnel. Terrorist attacks carried out by the same "Albanian
Liberation Army" active in Macedonia proved that the organization
was at least partially staffed by the KPC- Kosovo's allegedly
legitimate police force, composed of old KLA members. Reports from
Kosovo Albanian media indicated a close intelligence cooperation
between the SHIK (Kosovo Intelligence) and its counterpart in
Tirana. Later comments from AKSH representative Idajet Beqiri also
attested to connections for the group in Albania itself.


In general terms, 2003 saw a continuing process of Westernization
and cooperation with NATO and the US. Macedonian security
officials attended conferences and training seminars in far-flung
European cities. Cooperation on anti-terrorist training was
increased as the reshaping of the military got underway.

Western reforms and re-orientation; weaknesses and strengths


Defense Minister Buchkovski's stated goal- eventual NATO
accession- involved adherence to the larger goals of the NATO
alliance and US defense planners in Europe- a lighter, faster and
more dynamic defense force capable of countering urban terrorism,
that is, "asymmetrical threats." This philosophy was behind the
projected sale of Macedonia's few Sukhoi jet fighters in favor of
acquiring more helicopters.


Another tactic for appeasing the West was sending troops to Iraq.
Since they all returned safe, one might say all's well that ends
well. In Iraq, these crack troops no doubt picked up valuable
experience in a truly "hot" zone, and seemed to be outfitted with
much better, American style gear upon their return. And they won
America's undying love, too.


America was not Macedonia's only military partner, however. In
October, PM Branko Crvenkovski met with his Russian counterpart,
Mikhail Kasyanov in Moscow, and signed a pact on military
cooperation (mostly, however in the area of repairing existing
Russian made equipment). Still, this was a good sign in an
improved year for bilateral relations with Moscow.


Additionally, Macedonian police, defense and intelligence forces
expanded cooperation with neighboring countries on matters ranging
from Albanian militants to customs checks to weapons smuggling.
While the little country is still finding its place in Europe,
Macedonia's geography meant that it continued to be of interest to
security forces of many countries, even if a war was not taking
place.


In 2003, Macedonia's strength continued to be direct, human
intelligence, while open-source intelligence and high-tech
remained under-used. Since Kosovo remained the country's number
one concern, one would have expected that cooperation with Serbia
would have been solid. However, this issue was ambivalent as
informed sources on both sides argued for or against the quality
of cooperation. Serbia's armed forces proceeded along the same
lines of NATO reform, though its leadership was afflicted
additionally by never-ending Hague indictments.


On the level of personnel, Macedonia's greatest problem continued
to be the suspect allegiances of ranking members of the police,
intelligence and defense ministries. All of these ministerial
slots had been given to Macedonians, meaning that (for reasons of
political correctness) the ministers' immediate subordinates had
to be from the Albanian DUI party. This meant, essentially, that
the same people who had participated in terrorist attacks against
the state in 2001 would have access to the most classified
information available- and, conceivably, shares it with
paramilitaries. This thorny problem is not likely to be solved,
though it did not present overt and publicized dangers to the
fragile coalition in 2003.


Terrorism and militant attacks: imagined and real


While Islamic extremism received plenty of coverage, in 2003
Macedonia fortunately escaped the wrath of the jihadis. There had
been fears that the country's support for Iraq would make it a
target. Yet Macedonia likely did not seem a juicy enough target
for al Qaeda to waste its time on. However, if we are to believe
recent Bulgarian reports, a small amount of Albanian "students"
from Macedonia sent for religious education in Jordan and the Gulf
were being indoctrinated, and either sent to Afghanistan, or sent
home to seek new converts. Macedonian authorities continued their
scrutiny of specific figures in the Islamic religious community,
and even became interested in a few more.


As usual, the biggest threat to life and limb came from the
ostensibly secular Albanian extremists based in Kosovo, Skopska
Crna Gora and Lipkovo. Yet save for a few needless deaths, they
were unable to do much. The overnight sensation "Commander
Chakala," blustering his demands and deadlines from the hills,
only provoked a limited police action, checkpoints, and jokes from
Macedonians. The Interior Ministry claimed that Chakala only had
20-30 followers, all "criminals." These opinions were publicly
backed by the US, EU and OSCE.


A provocation of unquestionably criminal nature occurred after the
escape and re-capture of Dilaver Bojku, or "Leka," a famous
prostitution boss from Struga. He had escaped in a suspiciously
easy way, leading critics to wonder whether his friends in high
places were helping him. After a vociferous outcry from the
internationals, Leku was recaptured. He subsequent bombing of a
courthouse in Struga was meant as a warning to the authorities.
Still, the intimidated locals were glad to see him go.


The deaths of two Polish NATO soldiers who drove over an
Albanian-planted landmine on March 4 internationalized the issue.
The mine had been meant for a Macedonian army patrol. Waning
support for the Albanian cause dropped to nil in the immediate
aftermath of the murders.


May was a trying month for Macedonian security officials. First
was the embarrassing Vejce incident, which proved that no force on
earth, not even the US Ambassador, is capable of persuading
stubborn Albanian peasants to give way. A planned and
pre-announced ceremony, for family members to lay flowers on the
place where a massacre of soldiers had taken place in 2001, was
stymied by Albanian villagers in Vejce. Their refusal to stop
blocking the road made Minister Kostov threaten to quit, and even
angered US Ambassador Butler. The government's inability to deal
decisively with the villagers showed the continuing political
fragility of the "Albanian question" in Macedonia. A similar
affirmation of this was seen just over the border in Kosovo, where
an internationally sanctioned, UN-implemented border crossing plan
was scrapped at the last minute due to the bellyaching of Albanian
villagers.


In late May, following the arrest of an Albanian over the 2 NATO
deaths, the village of Sopot (near south Serbia, north
of Kumanovo) made its own threats. Villagers gave the Macedonian
police an ultimatum of 48 hours to release the suspect, Sulejman
Sulejmani. This member of the "Albanian National Army" was viewed
as a hero by the locals, who interestingly enough made it clear
that the EU-led Concordia mission was not welcome, either. This
Albanian turning against the West, increasingly noted in Kosovo,
was one of the year's most ominous signs for the future.


Some foreign journalists were tipped off that a new conflict would
began in early September, perhaps meant to coincide with the
arrival of the English football team on the 5th. A small
disturbance did occur, near the village of Brest on Skopska Crne
Gora, when the police and army (supported by helicopters) took on
about 5 Albanian militants led by a so-called "Commander Brechta."
Two Albanians were killed in the fighting, one wounded and two
escaped. The "international community" cautiously voiced support
for the government's action, which had occurred as a result of
typical Albanian provocations (the kidnapping of police officers
in Aracinovo and a bombing in Skopje).


As temperatures dipped, the guns cooled off too, and verbal
provocations took the place of military ones. Safe in their
diaspora lairs, Albanian extremist leaders plotted and raised
funds for whatever adventures are to come next. However, a growing
international disdain for the movement and better intelligence
have helped the Macedonians to suppress this threat.


Weapons collection theatrics


An operation that provoked great Western unease was the weapons
collection of November and December. One of the Ohrid Accord's key
stipulations, this ill-fated plan was meant to disarm those
citizens (in villages, mostly) who distrusted the state and who
might wage war again. A massive advertising campaign before the
month-long event failed to change anyone's  minds. As expected,
not even the prospect of prizes such as washing machines and cars
could inspire many people to turn over the goods; in the end, only
about 5,000 guns were turned in, most of them too old or rusty to
use. As with NATO's disarmament of the NLA in 2001, this was
merely a simulated show of good will and progress. That very few
people handed in their guns indicated their belief in a potential
future war.


While the weapons collection was mainly a political stunt and thus
to be discussed in that context, we can say that for the security
forces, the mission was successful. That is to say, no one was
killed or injured and tensions were kept to a minimum. The West
had feared the worst and begged the Macedonians to defer the
collections 'til spring. However, their fears proved unfounded-
just as was their optimism for a rich "harvest."


Conclusions


For Macedonian security and defense, 2003 was a year characterized
by three themes: NATO cooperation and modernization programs;
keeping the Kosovo and Kosovo-directed threats under control; and
restoring Western trust through executing cool-headed security
actions and a peaceful weapons collection program.


The first was by and large a success. Defense Minister Buchkovski
recently stated that Macedonia is on track to join NATO in 2006.
Almost as a reward, the EU military mission was ended in December
in favor of Proxima- an unarmed 200-strong battalion designed to
fight crime. For its part, NATO decided against removing its
entire staff, even though its official mission had concluded-
because they may as well stay to help oversee the modernization
and accession process.


A late-breaking incident that may get ugly saw the US slap
sanctions on a Macedonian businessman, Blagoja Samakoski, and his
company, Mikrosam on 24 December. The US placed a two-year
contract ban on Mikrosam, claiming that the company's "missile
proliferation technology violated the US Arms Export Control Act.
As this story continues to unfold, more interesting details are
likely to emerge.


As for the Kosovo situation, results here were more ambivalent.
Attacks on border posts and forts continued, and land mines and
bombings took the lives of Macedonian soldiers, civilians and
foreign troops as well. The growing despair of the UNMIK
administration over the lack of a happy exit strategy was readily
apparent. For this reason, perhaps, 2003 saw an increased
international resolve against Albanian extremists, as
international troops and civilian officials started to come under
fire too. For the first time since very early 2001, Macedonian
actions against rogue elements were tolerated and even respected.
International cooperation resulted in the arrests of several
important figures, including AKSH leader Gaiffur Adili in Albania
and Idajet Beqiri in Germany. However, the former was released,
and the similar release of Agim Ceku- detained by Slovenia on a
Serbian Interpol warrant- showed the extent to which the situation
is still being dictated by the men with guns, men who still have
designs on Macedonia. We're not out of the woods yet.